Most current modeling for evolution of communication still underplays or ignores the role of local action in spatialized environments: the fact that it is immediate neighbors with which one tends to communicate, and from whom one learns strategies or conventions of communication. Only now are the lessons of spatialization being learned in a related field:
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Huberman and Glance found results "which do not correspond at all to the behavior found for synchronous updating," and which thus "cast into doubt the conclusions recently obtained concerning territoriality and the universality of long-term averages of cooperation" (7716). An early move toward spatialization was stalled.
Oliphant (1994) countered Huberman and Glance's criticism, showing that any claim that Nowak and May's general results depended on synchronized updating were overstated. Oliphant's model was again restricted to simple strategies of C and D, this time organized in a one-dimensional wrap-around ring, but with asynchronous updating in Huberman and Glance's preferred sense. 7 Oliphant finds a wide range of behavior in such a model, but notes that spatialization favors cooperation even without simultaneous updating: "While non-spatial populations quickly fall into defection, spatial populations are able to evolve and maintain cooperative behavior" (351).
Lindgren and Nordahl (1994) take spatialization further in considering a lattice of strategies with a range of memory depths. They conclude that spatial dynamics allows for diverse communities using either synchronous or asynchronous updating, including forms of coexistence between cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. With a brief treatment of the updating issue, our own previous work (Grim 1995 (Grim , 1996 uses a spatialization of stochastic strategies, showing success of more generous strategies in a spatialized environment. Brauchli, Killingback, and Doebeli (1999) use an extended set of stochastic strategies, showing greater success for generous forms of Pavlov in a spatialized environment.
There have also been more recent indications that spatialization has an important role to play in game theory. Most of the modeling in Danielson (2001) , regarding reciprocity and cooperation, is non-spatial. In a final section, however, he suggests that spatial effectsspecifically, the mechanism of imitating one=s most successful neighbor in a one-dimensional cellular automata-may be important for the spread of cooperation. 8 William Harms (2000) introduces an 'agent-patch' model, which distributes a population of cooperator and defector agents across a spatialized grid of 'patches'. Agents interact randomly with other agents on the same patch, reproduce when they accumulate enough 'fitness points,' and die when their points fall to zero. Harms identifies population viscosity-the fact that kin are born and remain in the same basic location-as one factor that can result in increased gains and thus population growth for cooperators; viscosity allows cooperators to benefit from interaction with their own kind and to avoid interacting with defectors. 9 Although the models in Skyrms (1996) tend not to be spatial, he occasionally mentions viscosity as a feature of potential interest. 10 More recently, Skyrms has argued that the Stag Hunt may be a more appropriate game-theoretic model for studying cooperation than the standard Prisoner=s Dilemma, 11 but finds that local action alone is insufficient to generate cooperation in the Stag Hunt (Skyrms 2001; see also Skyrms and Pemantle, 2000) . Cooperators do prosper, however, if the model also includes the possibility of reinforced patterns of interaction, allowing stag hunters to seek out other stag hunters with which to interact, and if it incorporates localized strategy change in which an agent imitates successful neighbors. "Here, we finally have a model that can explain the institution of a modest social contract" (Skyrms 2001, 38) .
Work on 'altruism' and 'cooperation', then, falls into two related but distinct research traditions. Within the biological 'altruism' tradition the importance of spatialization is now clearly recognized under the category of 'viscosity'. Despite occasional indications, the importance of spatialization is not yet as clearly recognized in the socially more suggestive work on game-theoretic cooperation. In what follows we want to offer some graphic examples that underscore the importance of space.
Spatialized Models for Cooperation
The classical models of Axelrod, Axelrod and Hamilton, and Nowak and Sigmund, though global with respect to both action and strategy change, do show emergence of cooperation. The more recent suggestions in Nowak and May, Harms, Danielson, and Skyrms are that spatialization further favors cooperation: that only with spatialization does cooperation appear in certain contexts (Skyrms 2001; Nowak and May 1992, 1993) , or that cooperation appears in a different and more robust way in spatialized environments (Danielson 2001 , Harms 2000 . Our results further support these more recent suggestions. Here we offer a simple illustration of the dramatic difference that simple spatialization-in particular, spatialized reproduction or strategy change-can make for the appearance of cooperation.
Consider first an array of the 8 elementary 'reactive' strategies in a Prisoner=s Dilemma:
those which use only the opponent=s play on the previous round as their input for choice on the current round. Unlike Nowak and May (1992, 1993) and Harms (2000) , it should be noted, we employ a range of strategies beyond All-C and All-D. We instantiate our 8 strategies at random in cells of a two-dimensional wrap-around or torroidal array. Each cell plays an iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma game of 200 rounds with only its immediate neighbors-those eight cells touching it at sides or diagonally. At that point each cell totals its points, and the most successful cell on the board then 'reproduces' into random sites across the display. Here 5% of sites are replaced across the board with that strategy that has proven most successful in its local action. In this first model, then, competitive action is local-each cell plays an iterated Prisoner=s Dilemma with only its immediate neighbors-but reproduction is global. Cells again play an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with their new neighbors, and the cycle is repeated.
Global reproduction of this sort shows a clear and complete conquest by All-D.
Cooperation, in the form of TFT, makes no showing at all. Typical evolution of a randomized array is shown in Figure 1 .
Let us now localize strategy replacement as well as strategy interaction. In this variation of the model, each cell identifies its most successful neighbor. If that neighbor has a higher score than its own, the cell adopts that neighbor's strategy. 12 There is no guarantee, of course, that the most successful neighbor of a given cell is the most successful strategy on the board as a whole: this is a model in which strategy replacement, like strategy interaction, proceeds purely locally.
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Here as in the global model All-D shows early gains. Defectors initially gain by exploiting neighboring 'sucker strategies.' Although All-D does well in that environment, however, it does very poorly in play against itself, gaining only 1 point in each exchange. Tit for Tat, on the other hand, does well against itself, chalking up 3 points per exchange. Once All-D occupies the bulk of the field, then, clusters of Tit for Tat start to grow, thriving in groups in which members benefit from mutual cooperation. Neighboring cells convert to the higherscoring Tit for Tat, which eventually conquers the full array ( Figure 2 ). Together, localized action and localized reproduction in a spatialized model favor the growth of cooperation.
As noted above, Huberman and Glance (1993) suggested that the spatialization results favoring altruism in Nowak and May (1993) might be an artifact of simultaneous updating. It is 13 thus interesting to repeat this exercise without simultaneous updating. Figure 3 shows typical evolution of a spatialized array in which only 1% of cells in the array, chosen randomly, update in any generation. It is clear that here at least it is the use of local action and reproduction in a spatialized model, rather than simultaneous as opposed to non-simultaneous updating, that is responsible for the triumph of cooperation.
Still working in a global model, Nowak and Sigmund showed that changing to a range of imperfect game-theoretic strategies increases the level of generosity (Nowak 1990, Nowak and Sigmund, 1992) . In a world of stochastic noise, the ultimate winner is 'Generous Tit for Tat,' more willing to forgive defection against it than standard TFT. If you cooperate with GTFT, its probability of cooperating with you is close to 1; if you defect against GTFT, however, it will forgive that defection with a probability of 1/3. In previous work, we have found that spatialization increases the role of generosity still further: in a spatialized version of Nowak and Sigmund's stochastic model, the optimal strategy turns out to be one that forgives defection with a probability of 2/3, twice that of Nowak and Sigmund's GTFT (Grim 1995 (Grim , 1996 .
Spatialization and the Evolution of Communication
Although the classical models for emergence of cooperation are global, emergence of cooperation is strongly favored in a spatialized environment. We want to suggest that the same is true for communication.
Previous work in modeling communication can be divided into (1) entirely nonspatialized models and (2) partially spatialized models-usually with a spatialized task but without spatialized reproduction. The models we offer here use a more thorough spatialization 14 of both task and reproduction.
4.1
Non-spatialized models
Entirely non-spatialized models appear in MacLennan (1991) , MacLennan and Burghart (1994) , Noble and Cliff (1996) , Levin (1995) , Batali (1995), and Oliphant (1999 of 'behavers.' They are then added to the global pool of 'behavers', another member is removed at random, and the cycle is repeated with a new 'learner'.
Partially spatialized models
Some studies employ a spatialized task, but without spatialized reproduction or strategy change.
Hutchins and Hazelhurst (1995) The classical model for evolution of communication involving a spatialized task is that of Werner and Dyer (1991) . The females in their population cannot move, but have an ability to 'see' males a short distance away. When a female senses a nearby male, she emits a signal; though males are blind, they respond to signals 'heard' from females. On mating, two offspring (one male and one female) are produced whose genomes are formed through genetic crossover and mutation of their parents' genomes. To this point Werner and Dyer's model is nicely spatialized. After reproduction, however, the parents are moved to a random placement elsewhere in the grid. Although the mating task in the model is conceived spatially, therefore, reproduction results in random relocation in the global array: action but not reproduction is spatialized, and Werner and Dyer admit that this global randomization may have hindered speciation in the population.
Use of a spatialized task without spatialized reproduction also characterizes Saunders and Pollack (1996) , Cangelosi and Parisi (1998), and Wagner (2000) . Saunders and Pollack (1996) use a population of neural network agents and a cooperative task of resource consumption. No agent can consume the resource by itself; for that it must recruit others. Fitness is rated on how by a genome, acquires fitness by gaining resources, but at least one other organism must be present in a sector containing resources; at that point both benefit. Mate selection, however, remains non-spatial; mates are chosen based on fitness levels across the population as a whole, and the population tends to converge to a single genotype as a result.
Spatialization and reward structure
The most thoroughly spatialized study to date, other than our own previous models, is perhaps that of Ackley and Littman (1994) . Theirs is a population of neural networks conceived hierarchically on individual, local, and and global levels. The task is spatial in that individuals move horizontally on their own personal tracks, either toward or away from food and predators Hutchins and Hazlehurst (1995) , Levin (1995) , Saunders and Pollack (1996) , Noble and Cliff (1996) , Cangelosi and Parisi (1998), Oliphant (1999) , and Wagner (2000) .
The need for a model of how communication regarding non-shared tasks might originate is noted explicitly by a number of authors (Dyer (1995) , Ackley and Littman (1994) , Noble and Cliff(1996) , Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) . Batali (1995) 
Spatialized Models for Communication
Here as with the case of cooperation we want to show an important contrast between spatialized and non-spatialized models.
We again use a randomized 64 x 64 cellular automata array of individuals carrying different strategies. can envisage in base 3 using 0, 1, and 2 for 'make no sound', 'make sound s1', and 'make sound s2' for places f and h, and for 'random selection', 'open mouth', and 'hide' for places s1 and s2.
Strategy <0,1,2,1>, for example, makes no sound when fed, sounds S1 when hurt, hides on hearing S1 but opens its mouth on hearing S2.
Among these 81 strategies are precisely two that we consider 'perfect communicators': strategies <1,2,1,2> and <2,1,2,1>. Strategy <1,2,1,2> makes sound S1 when fed and sound S2 when hurt, responding symmetrically to S1 by opening its mouth and to S2 by hiding. Strategy <2,1,2,1> follows the same pattern with sounds S1 and S2 interchanged. Consider a uniform field of 'perfect communicators' <1,2,1,2>. On successfully feeding, a cell of this strategy will make sound S1. Its neighbors, on hearing that sound, will open their mouths. Since food sources migrate cell by cell in a random walk, each neighboring cell will thereby increase its probability of feeding. A similar but slightly more complicated pattern can be expected if neighbors hide in response to sound S2 when a cell is 'hurt' by a predator. 20 A uniform field of the other 'perfect communicator' strategy <2,1,2,1> would show the same advantages, though with the role of signals S1 and S2 reversed.
Let us begin with an array randomized across 6 different 'Adam and Eve' strategies, chosen to avoid any 'perfect communicators' but to represent each option (0, 1, or 2) in each of our four variable places. Our environment includes 50 food sources and 100 predators moving in random walks across the array, and our agents gather and lose points by feeding and predation over the course of 100 rounds. At that point we select our two highest-scoring distinct strategies to use in a genetic algorithm. We replace a random 5% of our population with 2-point crossover hybrids of our two top strategies, using a different random choice of crossover points in our parent strategies for each cell replaced. In each generation, therefore, 5% of the array is replaced with (variant) offspring of our two highest strategies. The genetic variability of the array is increased, new strategies may emerge as the highest-scoring, and hybrids from these replace 5%
of the population in turn. The result is a fairly standard global genetic algorithm, similar to many used in work regarding communication.
What happens with communication under this form of global algorithm? The short answer is that patterns of communication do not emerge. Figure 4 shows percentages for particular strategies over the course of 10,000 generations, beginning with our Adams and Eves. Given the character of our genetic algorithm (breeding always the two highest-scoring distinct strategies), no strategy can ever go to complete fixation in the array. In fact, competition continues through 10,000 generations primarily between strategies <1,1,1,1>, <1,0,1,1>, <2, 1,1,1> and <2,0,1,1>. None is even close to a perfect communicator. Figure 5 shows an enlargement of the last 2500 generations of the run. In none of our repeated runs, using different randomized seeds and different initial Adams and Eves, did either of our perfect communicators play a significant role.
We also varied the global genetic algorithm so as to 'breed' the two highest-scoring strategies in the array even when these happened to be the same. When they are the same,of course, it is not hybrids but a pure parental strategy that is scattered into 5% of the array. In this variation we were surprised to see that a 'perfect communicator' did significantly better, playing a subsidiary role through approximately the 1400 th generation. In the end, though, it could not compete: it is <2,1,1,1> and <2,2,1,1> that dominate ( Figure 6 ), with success to the former in 3221 generations.
Replacing a global genetic algorithm with a local form of reproduction makes a dramatic difference. In the local variation, at the end of every 100 rounds, each cell looks around to see if it has an immediate neighbor that has proven more successful. If so, it 'breeds' with that neighbor and is replaced by a hybrid. The two-point crossover mechanism of genetic algorithm remains the same, but here all reproduction has become purely local. Figure 7 shows the clear emergence of a perfect communicator using a localized rather than a global genetic algorithm. All other parameters of the model, including the initial randomization pattern and initial set of Adams and Eves, are the same. By 1039 generations, the particular.
Here we want to offer illustrations of some of the surprises of spatial dynamics, with some first moves toward an analytic understanding.
We simplify by dealing with only two strategies at a time, using only four variables for We use the 'most successful neighbor' aspect of strategy change employed in both cooperation and communication studies above, here in the form of pure imitation. After competition with each of its immediate neighbors, each cell looks around to see if any neighbor has a higher total score. If so, it copies the strategy of its most successful neighbor.
The first surprise is that an 'inferior' strategy-one that does more poorly playing against itself-can conquer a 'superior' strategy in a spatialized array of this type. Crucial here is the gain each strategy makes in competition with the other at an interface. Consider, for example, a simple array divided between two strategies, as in Figure 9a . Although strategy A may score only one point in play against itself, while strategy B scores 2 points against itself, strategy A can still invade B. Using AB to represent A's score when playing B, this will for example happen 25 when gains <AA, AB, BA, BB> are <1, 4, 2, 2>. Here spatialization alone seems to counter what one might expect in terms of evolution toward fixation. Although a uniform population of B's would have twice as high an average score as a uniform population of A's, it is A's that invade to conquer.
In this case A invades B, despite an inferior score against itself, just because A's score against B at the border is so much higher than B's against A. But it is not the case that relative AB and BA scores at the interface are sufficient for success or failure. If we leave scores otherwise the same but raise B's gain against itself from 2 points to 3, the invasion will be reversed. For gains <AA, AB, BA, BB> at <1, 4, 2, 3>, it is the B that will invade A, as in Figure 9b . The set of scores <1,3,1,2> gives us a standoff, in which neither strategy is able to invade the other (Figure 9c ).
For elementary boundary cases of this sort, the algebra is simple. Where AA is A's score against itself and AB its score against B, A will invade B just in case We will have a standoff, with no invasion, when neither inequality is satisfied. It should be notd, however, that two importantly different strategy relationships can produce a standoff. In one case, which might be thought of as a static standoff, the scores of all bordering cells are equal.
Each cell thus chooses to retain its current strategy. In another case, which might be thought of as a dynamic standoff, a cell A on the border may have B neighbors with a higher score, but may retain strategy A because its non-border A neighbors get a higher score still. Here a boundary remains in place not because all scores are equal, but because the cells with a strategy losing at the interface are replaced from their own ranks.
Unfortunately, analysis for spatial dynamics quickly becomes more complex. The inequalities above do not hold, for example, when the configuration of the border is changed by even a single cell (Figure 9d ).
In this case we can still compute the score balances required for invasion and standoff, but the required inequalities become clumsier. In the array shown in Figure 9d This is the calculation required for a single generation at a single site. We can of course crunch the numbers in each such case, but any general patterns dictating invasion patterns seem to be lost in mere arithmetic.
Similar analytical complexities quickly arise regarding other simple dynamics. Consider invasion by a single cell of strategy A in a field of strategy B, growing to occupy a 3 x 3 block of cells (Figure 10 ). In this case the algebra is simple: Strategy A can invade only if 8AB > max (8BB, 7BB + BA). It is also possible to prove that invasion will occur with a limit of precisely 50% for the range of possible values that might be put in for AB, BB, and BA (see Appendix 1).
AA can be left out of consideration because our initial cell does not play itself.
Algebra will take us this far. But what occurs at the next step, in those 50% of cases in which a block of 9 cells has been established? At this second stage there are at least four possibilities for growth, shown in Figure 11 .
Values AA, AB, BA, and BB all prove important, and here we were forced to resort to surveys.
In a first survey we used all integer values between 0 and 1000 for each of AA, AB, BA, BB, checked in a second variation using values at .01 intervals between 0 and 1. In a third survey we used random values between 0 and 1000000, with the same results. In the pattern of growth shown in Fig. 11a , the block of 9 shrinks again to 1. In our surveys we found this to occur in approximately 11% of the nine-cell cases. In the pattern shown in Fig. 11b , the block expands from 9 cells to 25, a result we have found for approximately 58% of cases. In the pattern of Fig.   11c the block of 9 shrinks to a static cross formation. This we found in only about 1.5% of our sample. Finally, in the pattern shown in Fig. 11d , the block of 9 expands to a 'castellated' configuration with a nick on each side. This result shows up with a frequency of approximately 30% in our surveys.
The illustrations we have offered here consider only two strategies and invasion from a single cell or along a linear border. The increase in complexity even from a first step to a second is intimidating. Our experience thus parallels that of other investigators: simulation is easy but analysis is hard. Van Baalen and Rand (1998) note that "Invasion in viscous populations is a
process that is hard to analyze" (632).
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Thus, for the evolution of altruism there must be discreteness and associated stochasticity (Goodnight, 1992) . This means that we should analyze models that are individual-based as well as spatial. Probabilistic cellular automaton (PCA) models ... satisfy these criteria. However, even when we assume haploid reproduction (and thus ignore genetics) such PCA models are easy to stimulate but very hard to analyze. (633) It should also be noted that the complexities of spatial dynamics make 'invasion' too simple a category. Which of the typical dynamics shown in Figure 12 , for example, should count as 'invasion'? Some clearly do, in that any finite area is eventually occupied by the invading strategy. But in some the introduced strategy grows or expands only to shrink in a later generation. In others the introduced strategy expands without ever taking over, always leaving islands of the other strategy. What happens in the spatial dynamics of a more diverse population will depend on all of these dynamics, and a simple single category of 'invasion' seems inadequate to do them justice.
21 Figure 13 shows a particularly elaborate form of invasion, here using <3.49, 1, 5, 1> as our values for <AA, AB, BA, BB>.
On the basis of simulations, it is clear that spatialization is an important factor in emergence of both cooperation and communication. Difficulties of complexity, however, quickly swamp the search for analytic understanding. It is possible and perhaps even likely that there can be no algorithm adequate for predicting invasion patterns in general-it is known that similar questions are undecidable for the general case in the spatialized prisoner's dilemma, for example (Grim 1997, Grim, Mar, and St. Denis, 1998) . At this point resort to approximation techniques seems a necessary alternative (Durrett and Levin 1994a, 1994b; Durrett 1999; Van Baalen and Rand 1998; Snyder and Nisbet 2000; Filipe and Maule 2003) .
Conclusion
There are three neglected features of primary importance, we want to argue, in Emergence of both cooperation and communication can depend crucially on local as opposed to global organization, and we ignore the role of spatialization at the risk of missing major aspects of the phenomenon under study. Contemporary resources for simulation make development of spatial models in both cases relatively easy. A full analytic understanding of the dynamics of spatial organization, on the other hand, is another matter.
In growth from a single cell to a block of 9, as illustrated in Fig. 10 , it is possible to prove that invasion will occur with a limit of precisely half for the range of possible values that might be put in for AB, BB, and BA. AA can be left out of consideration because our initial cell does not play itself. Using the inequality for expansion 8AB > max(8BB, 7BB+BA), we proceed by cases on the right side: 40 Case 1. Max (8BB, 7BB + BA) = 8BB just in case BB > BA (1). Where values for BB > BA are chosen randomly and independently, this condition will hold in 50% of cases. Expansion from 1 cells to 9 occurs in this first case just in case 8AB > 8BB and thus just in case AB > BB.
Where values for AB and BB are chosen independently, this condition will also hold in 50% of cases. Choice of values for AB, BA, and BB will thus give us expansion under case 1 in 25% of all cases. Since the lowest bound for , is 0, the upper bound for 7BB + BA = 8BA -7, is 8BA. Expansion occurs in this second case just in case 8AB is greater than that upper bound; just in case 8AB > 8BA, or AB > BA. Where values for AB and BA are chosen independently, this condition will also hold in 50% of cases. Choice of values for AB, BA, and BB will thus give us expansion under case 2 in 25% of all cases.
In total, we can thus expect expansion from 1 cell to a 3 x 3 block of 9 for precisely ½ of assignable values. (Sigmund 1998, Sigmund and Hauert 2002; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak and Sigmund 1998) . Status is the core of some theories of both types: that altruistic acts increase an individual's perceived value, and thus increase contributions 42 to his fitness from the community (Alexander 1987 , Grafen, 1990 Zahavi, 1977) . On this pattern, an individual might benefit from his altruistic acts even if he never again interacts with the beneficiaries of those acts. Here again, however, the fact that an individual benefits from such a pattern of behavior makes it doubtful that it qualifies as 'altruistic' in the strict biological sense. 4 In Axelrod 1997, an average individual is given one mating, while an individual one standard deviation more effective than the average is given two. Successful individuals are randomly paired for crossover, and the process is repeated for the new pool. This is actually the more interesting of two models Axelrod explores. In the other, a pool of strategies changes over generations, but the fitness measure remains the same: success against 8 strategies representative of those submitted in the second of Axelrod's tournaments. 5 Use of TFT in place of All-C gives a similarly simple but different result. For All-C vs All-D in a sufficiently iterated game, where CD indicates the gain of All-C against All-D, DC > CC > DD > CD. Replacing All-C with TFT, on the other hand, gives us TT > DT > DD > TD. Some more recent attempts have at least broadened the field to 3 strategies, using All-C, All-D, and TFT as a 'discriminating' strategy (Harms 2001).
Notes
Grim, Mar, and St. Denis, 1998), we note that spatialization of this form fits the main outlines of the particle swarm paradigm elaborated in Kennedy, Eberhart, and Shi (2001) .
14 Theoretical work on biological questions of 'costly signaling' has also generally been nonspatial. See Zahavi (1977) , Smith (1991) , Godfray (1995) , Bergstrom and Lachmann (2001) .
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15 Noble and Cliff claim to find "at least a topology, if not a geometry" in the MacLennan and Burghardt study: "simorgs will tend to receive signals from their immediate neighbors in one direction, and send signals to their neighbors in the other direction" (613). We take this to be a misunderstanding of the MacLennan and Burghardt study, since all simorgs receive any signals and are judged in terms of 'internal' matches to those signals. For our purposes, however, since we are arguing that spatialization should be included in models for communication, the degree of purity in excluding spatialization seems moot. 16 In Cangelosi and Parisi (1998) the task is that of identifying nearby mushrooms as edible or poisonous and moving towards edible or away from poisonous mushrooms. Communication is somewhat artificially encouraged by limits on perception. A mushroom-hunting organism can see mushrooms at some distance, but can only observe their perceptual properties (whether edible or poisonous) if they are one square away. To aid agents in identifying mushrooms from further away, they are offered a far-sighted conspecific, randomly chosen from the population, which emits signals to aid in identification of the mushrooms. The near-sighted organisms must then learn to encode and interpret these signals correctly.
17 Di Paolo (1999) notes that spatialization of models can introduce very different results in evolution of communication. But he criticizes some, particularly Ackley and Littman (1994) and Oliphant (1996) , for attributing these differences to 'kin selection' while doing little to confirm the theory's applicability. Di Paolo argues that " [t] his careless appeal to kin-selective arguments is dangerous" (505) and offers a model which concludes that the emergence of cooperation in spatial models should not be necessarily attributed to kin selection. Di Paolo's charges may be unduly barbed: as far as we can tell, the authors criticized mention kin selection only as a 45 possible explanation. 18 In a very different study regarding linguistic change and formation of dialects, Livingstone and Fyfe (1999) do explicitly compare global and local models, as we do here. In that context they show that spatialization produces greater linguistic diversity. 19 On each round, each food source and each predator is assigned a random number between 1 and 9; depending on that number it will move into one of the neighboring 8 cells or remain where it is. A cell adjacent to one with a food source thus has a 1 in 9 chance of having that food source on it in the next generation; similarly for predators. The 'payoff' for received communication in a community of perfect communicators is thus an increase in the probability of successful feeding and of harm avoidance. 20 We use a larger number of predators because of different dynamics in response to a food call and a predator warning. In the case of a food call a chain reaction of eating and signaling is set up across a community of communicators, with exploitation of the food source on every round.
In response to a predation warning, on the other hand, neighbors 'hide', thereby preventing a predator hit the next time and preventing a further warning as well. As a result, even perfect communicators can avoid a predator hit only every other time. The number of food sources and predators is adjusted accordingly; it is for this reason that we use 50 food sources and 100 predators. For details see Grim, Kokalis, Tafti, and Kilb (2001) .
